

VZCZCXRO7989  
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR  
DE RUEHRH #1987/01 2690942  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6583  
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE  
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE  
RUEAHLA/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC 0160  
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC  
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 RIYADH 001987

SIPDIS

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DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, A/S KHARBERT, AND  
MILLIAMSON  
S/CT FOR GFEIERSTEIN AND BAVERILL  
DS/ATA FOR KMALOY  
TREASURY PASS TO A/S CLOWERY  
DHS PASS TO TWARRICK AND DGRANT  
CIA PASS TO TCOYNE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2017  
TAGS: [KCIP](#) [EPET](#) [ENERG](#) [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [SA](#)  
SUBJECT: JOINT WORKING GROUP ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE  
MEETS IN RIYADH

REF: RIYADH 1954

Classified By: A/DCM David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and (d).

11. This message has been cleared by DOE A/S Kolevar.

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Summary  
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12. (S) On September 11, the US-Saudi Joint Working Group (JWG) on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) met at the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in Riyadh, co-chaired by the MOI Director of Modernization Dr. Saud al-Semari, and the US Embassy's Economic Counselor Robert Barry Murphy. Ministry of Interior Special Advisor and Chief of Staff to Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif, Major General Dr. Saad al Jabri stressed the need for KSA to have contingency planning in place immediately for continued oil operations in the event of a terrorist or attack by a neighboring state. He asked the USG to begin to provide resources "as early as the next day" to address contingency planning issues. In addition, the JWG members reviewed June and September site assessment visits to key energy installations, and discussed proposed training curriculums for both the MOI and industrial security to be conducted by Sandia Labs and the Coast Guard. The JWG approved conducting a training needs assessment for the recently-established Facilities Security Force. The JWG briefly reviewed the status of a training funding mechanisms currently in the legal approval process, and approved in principal the establishment of technical committees as required on an ad hoc basis.

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Meeting Participants  
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13. (C) On the Saudi side, meeting participants included:

- Dr. Saud al Semari, MOI Director of Modernization and JWG Co-Chair
- Major General Dr. Saad al Jabri, Special Advisor and Chief of Staff to Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif
- Col. Saad al Ghamdi, MOI, Facilities Security Force (FSF)
- Col. Mohammed Raddadi, MOI, Coast Guard
- Fahad al Nefai, MOI, Mubahith
- Major Abdullah al Moaner, MOI, Mubahith
- Capt. Bandar al Subaie, MOI, Personal Assistant to Dr. al Jabri
- Abdullah al Shamrani, MOI, Head of Technical Planning, Department Civil Defense

On the US side, meeting participants included:

- Robert Barry Murphy, Embassy, Counselor for Economic Affairs and JWG Co-Chair
- Kevin Kolevar, Assistant Secretary, Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability
- Bruce Averill, Department of State, Senior Coordinator for Critical Infrastructure Protection
- Shannon Ross, Embassy, Energy Attache
- Kevin Maloy, Diplomatic Security/Anti-Terrorism Assistant Office
- Captain Don Grant, US Coast Guard
- Kevin Brown, Commander, US Coast Guard
- Randy Rhodes, US Coast Guard
- Richard Pacheco, Embassy, Economic Officer

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- Bassem Houssami, ConGen Jeddah, Pol/Econ Chief
- Pat Willging, Department of Energy
- Sarah Magruder, Department of Energy
- Rachael Beitler, Department of Energy
- Byron Gardner, Sandia National Laboratories
- Dominic Martinez, Sandia National Laboratories
- Guy Jones, Sandia National Laboratories
- Tommy Goolsby, Sandia National Laboratories
- Tim Malone, Sandia National Laboratories
- Ahmed Abdullat, Embassy, Department of Homeland Security
- Patrick Gillis, Embassy, Army Attache
- Joel Wiegert, Embassy, Political Military Affairs
- Capt. Fink, US Military Training Mission (USMTM) Naval Forces Division Chief
- Col. Hall, US Military Training Mission (USMTM) Marine Forces Division Chief

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MOI Outlines Threats to the Energy Sector;  
Saudi MOI Civil Defense Planning  
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14. (S) After welcoming remarks by the JWG Co-Chairs and A/S Kolevar, Abdullah Al-Shamrani, MOI Head of Technical Planning, Department of Civil Defense, briefed the JWG participants on the scale and scope of the contingency planning. He highlighted the possible threats within the petroleum, refining, petrochemical, power, and related industries. He noted that Riyadh alone had 1312 such installations the MOI considered possible terrorist targets, while acknowledging some were of much greater priority than others. He outlined the scope of the threat facing energy facilities, varying from operational error, conventional explosives, hazardous materials (hazmat), to external threats from neighboring states. He stressed the Iranian nuclear threat was the most critical external threat confronting the oil, power, and petrochemical industries in the region. He emphasized MOI fears that Iran would recruit agents to carry out internal sabotage and inflict environmental damage on the Kingdom.

15. (SBU) Shamrani then outlined the MOI's Civil Defense institutional structure, authorized by the 1986 Civil Defense Act, and headed by the Civil Defense Council, with the Minister of Interior as its lead. The General Directorate of Civil Defense coordinates efforts of the MOI and volunteers, and implements emergency management tasks. The General Administration of Civil Protection works to provide food, essential medical services, and disaster recovery. During emergencies, Shamrani indicated the MOI coordinates closely with the Ministries of Health, Defense, the Red Crescent, and municipalities. The MOI carried out planning for pre, during, and post emergency management phases. The MOI places a large emphasis on controlling hazmat threats, due to the large number of petroleum and petrochemical industries in the KSA, and on plans for water provision, due to the KSA's water-limited environment.

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Moving Ahead on Contingency Planning  
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16. (SBU) Kevin Kolevar, the Department of Energy's Assistant Secretary for Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE/OE), opened the US contingency planning presentation by noting he was pleased the US and Saudi models had much in common. For a Saudi audience accustomed to the energy sector being held in state hands, A/S Kolevar explained the US energy industry is entirely private. Nonetheless, he noted, government and the private sector cooperate in contingency planning, and regularly review their

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plans to decide if they are the most effective possible. Kolevar outlined national, regional, and local level responses, stating that the manner in which we prepare emergencies in the energy sector is relevant for other sectors as well.

17. (C) A/S Kolevar then laid out a USG proposal for a series of contingency planning workshops and training classes to better prepare the Saudis for a terrorist incident. These could include Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or Department of Homeland Security (DHS) first-responder training, up through workshops for senior management. The workshops could be held in the US or the KSA, as appropriate to the situation.

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The DOE Contingency Planning Model  
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18. (SBU) Pat Willging, DOE/OE Senior Energy Security Advisor, then presented DOE/OE's role in contingency planning for the US power and energy industry. He first noted that security measures decrease vulnerability to an attack, while contingency planning mitigates consequences when an attack occurs. Both are needed to ensure the continuity of business and operations. Willging emphasized that in the spectrum of resiliency of capability, plant managers must carefully balance both redundancy and recoverability of operations.

19. (SBU) Willging highlighted the partnership between government and industry for contingency planning and disaster response. Government responsibilities include continuity and response planning, while industry responsibilities include operational continuity and response planning. Both government and industry have a shared responsibility for coordination, exercising, and putting their plans into action. Willging also emphasized the need for a strong inter-agency effort to keep the energy sector functional in the event of an emergency. For example, energy sector personnel require functional roads and water systems to operate plants. He underscored the need for the energy sector to understand their most critical pieces of equipment, and not to confuse these with their most expensive or profitable pieces of equipment. The most critical equipment

should enjoy the highest level of protection.

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Importance of Disaster Planning and  
Exercising as an On-Going Process  
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¶10. (SBU) Willging pointed out that exercising for disasters is key, stating he personally spends 2-3 months a year simulating disasters with federal, state, local, and industry partners to ensure disaster response plans could be properly executed. He underscored industry utilizes personnel accountability processes to ensure key personnel and their families are fully supported during disasters, so that the personnel can focus on their jobs - restoring key power, refinery, and other facilities - without distraction.

¶11. (SBU) Willging advised frequent comprehensive plan reviews are needed, with 18 months at most between plans, due to changing conditions on the ground. He advocated government and industry engage in gap analyses, for example, to clarify which government or industry actor properly has a specific area of responsibility. He advised mitigation planning and table top exercises are the next steps in the cycle. Willging wrapped up by highlighting that the cycle of comprehensive plan reviews, gap analysis, mitigation planning, and tabletop exercises is continuous; when

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government and industry have completed one cycle, they should begin another.

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Government Can Help Ensure Clear Communication,  
Industry as Partners in Recovery  
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¶12. (C) Abdullah Shamrani, MOI Civil Defense, stated the Civil Defense division does not have the industry knowledge necessary to control an accident in a refinery or other energy facility; they would need industry people to do this. Kolevar responded by noting that the US had learned valuable lessons in responding to hurricanes in recent years, including cases in which the US responses had failed. He stressed the importance overcoming institutional barriers to communication. Working with DHS, DOE has re-vamped communication with other agencies. Most key communication barriers were organizational in nature, but some were technical. For example, DOE was working on how to ensure communications coverage in hurricane-affected areas.

¶13. (C) A/S Kolevar stated DOE has also worked closely with industry to emphasize that government must know the status of critical facilities and casualties. Industry has recognized neighboring industries matter a great deal more than previously thought. While they may normally be competitors, during an emergency, they are partners in recovery, for example, sharing assets and personnel to move fuel to first-responders.

¶14. (C) A/S Kolevar spoke about the appropriate role of government in an emergency situation, stating, "we do not own the assets, and companies will move out on their own to repair their facilities. The appropriate role of government is to facilitate, clearing roads, facilitating food and water delivery." He noted that DOE has at times exercised a stronger role in the national interest, for example, by directing the restoration of power services to a critical facility. Kolevar cautioned, however, such action is often a blunt instrument, which may cause other unintended difficulties. Coast Guard Rhodes cautioned that first-responders often were not trained to enter facilities where terrorists may still be carrying out their attack. At the same time, military or security forces who could respond to this threat may lack protective gear and training to enter a facility which has been attacked by a biological or

chemical agent.

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Offer of Scenario Planning Workshops  
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¶15. (C) A/S Kolevar stated both US industry and government conduct frequent scenario planning exercises, to prepare for possible events such as hurricanes, terrorist attacks, chemical/biological attacks, etc. Kolevar stated, "we would welcome the opportunity to look at this with you," offering MOI the opportunity to work with DOE in a scenario planning workshop. He noted DOE's experience during Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, prior to which DOE and industry had simulated the loss of 2 of 14 pumping stations on the key East coast Colonial pipeline. Instead, both hurricanes took out 7 pumping stations, an unprecedented situation. A/S Kolevar noted DOE and industry today regularly exercise the loss of 50% of pumping capacity, while appropriate modifications have been made to the pumping infrastructure to make such an occurrence less disastrous in the future.

¶16. (C) Dr. Khalid al Ageel, from the HCIS, stated that, "we need information on shut-down and prioritization schemes,

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shut-down procedures, and evacuation from platforms. Can DOE help us with this?" A/S Kolevar responded positively, and said he was encouraged to hear the Ministry of Petroleum and Saudi Aramco would also brought into this discussion, as they could supply technical information key to these types of discussions.

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Eastern Province Site Assessment Visits  
March, June 2007  
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¶17. (C) Moving to the assessment portion of the agenda, DS/ATA Maloy quickly re-capped the March land-based assessment visit to Ras Tanura, Qateef Junction, and Abqaiq Plants for the benefit of those who had not been present at earlier JWG meetings. He noted:

Positive Observations:

--Industrial security force preparedness has improved since initial assessments. Safety and security standards, and the evacuation procedures are in good shape.

-- Overall physical security has improved with the instillation of pipe barriers and perimeter vehicle barriers.

Areas of Concern:

--There is limited integration of security forces. Planning and training exercises need to be a joint effort with integrated control centers to help improve communication.

-- The DBT process needs to be better implemented at the sites. Performance based security upgrades should be implemented.

¶18. (C) US Coast Guard Capt. Don Grant briefed on the Eastern Province (EP) Maritime site assessments conducted in June 2007. This assessment surveyed maritime-side critical energy infrastructure in the EP (Ras Tanura and Ras al Juaymah), and reviewed Coast Guard capabilities and procedures to detect, delay and interdict a terrorist threat to these facilities. Grant indicated that in general he was pleased with the preparedness of the security forces. Capt. Grant highlighted positive areas and areas for improvement as follows:

Positive Observations:

- The EP has a highly regulated fishing and recreational boating operations.
- Aramco and the Coast Guard have extensive human visual detection of threats.
- There are frequent Aramco aircraft on patrol.
- There are high port security standards.

Areas of Concern:

- There was a need for more specific and consistent identification of critical components within Ras Tanura and Ras al Juaymah.
- Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) AIS was not integrated with radar.

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- There was no Coast Guard presence in Port Control.
- Responding Forces (Aramco/FSF/Coast Guard) have limited direct tactical communication.
- No Blue Force Tracking for Coast Guard.

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Yanbu Consultation Visit, September 2007  
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¶19. (C) DS/ATA Maloy provided an overview of the September 2007 visit to Yanbu Industrial City, and Sandia Labs Martinez conducted the land side briefing. The Yanbu Royal Commission provided an overview briefing and orientation tour for the team. The team then conducted a pre-assessment of the capabilities of security forces at Yanbu to detect, delay, and interdict a terrorist threat at six sites: the Yanbu Port Authority; Sabtank, a maritime petrochemical loading facility; Ibn Rashd, a SABIC acetic acid production facility; YANPET, a SABIC/ExxonMobil joint venture petrochemical plant; and SAMREF, a Saudi Aramco/ExxonMobil joint venture refinery. The team viewed access control points, security systems along the perimeter, and security and process control rooms as part of their overview. In these Yanbu facilities, the team observed good industrial security practices. However, security was not adequate to meet the terrorist threat defined in the June design basis threat (DBT) workshop.

Positive observations:

- The security forces are integrated. There is communication between the forces on procedures and planning.
- A continuous row of concrete barriers has been or is being installed around the entire industrial complex. Each industrial facility has a continuous fence with razor wire or barbed wire outriggers around the perimeter.
- Most of the facilities had two lines of detection along the perimeter, with lights and CCTV cameras.
- There appeared to be good communication between the industrial security forces, FSF, and operators within each of the security control centers. Security forces were equipped with two-way radios and land lines.

Areas of concern:

- There are minimal internal delay barriers.



--The current security systems in place at the Yanbu Industrial sites does not meet the new high level threat developed during the June 2007 DBT workshop. A vulnerability assessment for each facility should take place using the June 2007 DBT.

--There is no armed helicopter interdiction capability.

¶20. (C) The JWG team generally noted the Yanbu facilities seemed to enjoy better integration between industrial security, the FSF, the Coast Guard, and Border Guard than observed in the Eastern Province. Our Saudi counterparts explained the western region has less divisive tribal influences, and a generally more cooperative atmosphere. Additionally, the Yanbu Royal Commission appears to have allow the various industries and agencies a structure and forum for collaborating. The interlocutors noted that the influence of Saudi Aramco, so dominant in the Eastern

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Province, is noticeably less in Yanbu, apparently also leading to greater cooperation on the security front.

¶21. (C) USCG Captain Grant presented the maritime observations for the September 2007 Yanbu visit, summarized below:

Positive observations:

-- There was a Coast Guard presence in the Port Control Tower.

-- Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA): Radar was integrated with AIS displays at Port control.

-- There were high Port Security Standards.

Areas of Concern:

-- There was a need for more specific and consistent identification of critical components within the crude oil and refined product berths (as in the Eastern Province).

-- MDA: Coast Guard lacks Blue Force Tracking.

-- Coast Guard patrolling with weapons mounted and loaded is mission-dependent.

-- Coast Guard lacks armed helicopter interdiction capability.

-- Responding Coast Guard forces have limited direct tactical communications.

-- Coast Guard practices limited field training and exercises.

-- Coast Guard has no positive control boarding teams for large commercial vessels.

USMTM) representative Capt. Fink added that NAVCENT was training the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) in interdiction capability. Coast Guard Col. Raddadi added that the Saudi Coast Guard had carried out several exercises since the last JWG meeting had made recommendations to that effect, its teams becoming more effective with each subsequent exercise.

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Ramping Up Training for the  
Facilities Security Force  
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¶22. (SBU) Sandia Labs Byron Gardner presented a briefing on the Sandia Labs training curriculum for MOI management, stressing that it is designed to help them build a performance-based security system. Gardner reviewed the content and intended audiences for courses which we plan to implement for both the industrial security forces and the MOI

over the next several months.

¶23. (S) The discussion then turned the new Facilities Security Force which the MOI is recruiting for the protection of critical installations, such as energy, power, and water sites. Dr. al Jabri indicated the MOI has recruited 8000 new FSF soldiers this year, and plans to recruit 10,000 by year's end. Dr. al Jabri stated the Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif had discussed FSF recruitment and training with Vice-President Cheney, and Cheney had agreed the US would support the Kingdom in providing equipment and training for the FSF.

¶24. (C) Dr. al Semari provided an overview of training being provided to the FSF currently, through Pakistani

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military and other international involvement. Sandia Labs Guy Jones then presented a proposal for a 2-week Training Needs Assessment for the FSF, to be conducted both in Riyadh and on the ground at the temporary FSF training site in Mecca. The proposal was well-received, and was approved. Sandia Labs Gardner stated Sandia was prepared to begin training cooperation immediately. Dr. Saad pointed out the need to resolve funding mechanisms quickly, to allow FSF training cooperation to begin in earnest. The interlocutors concluded that S/CT Averill would be responsible for shepherding through the final conclusion of the funding documents. JWG Co-Chairs Dr. al Semari and Robert Murphy agreed to meet weekly.

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Progress on DBT Policy Document  
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¶25. (C) Dr. Khalid al Ageel reported on the progress of the adoption of the design basis threat (DBT) policy document since the June DBT workshop conducted by Sandia Labs. Dr. al Ageel noted the document classified critical facilities throughout Saudi Arabia (petroleum, water, power, and petrochemical facilities) as Tier, I, II, and III. Since July, the document had been translated, and circulated among the HCIS and intelligence communities. However, SAG consultants were still reviewing the document, and it was unclear when it would be adopted as a national policy document. On a separate but related track, al Ageel noted that the MOI's High Commission on Industrial Security (HCIS) would promulgate new industrial security standards next month, which for the first time would attempt to incorporate anti-terrorism standards. (Note: The MOI's HCIS is responsible for writing and implementing industrial security standards for firms in key sectors such as energy, petrochemicals, water, and power, until now all largely state-controlled sectors. New draft industrial security standards have been in circulation and revision for more than a year. End note.)

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Moving Ahead to the Next JWG;  
Deepening the JWG Organization Structure  
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¶26. (C) Dr. Saud al Semari opened the discussion on the structural development of the JWG, remarking on the need for increased administrative support for the JWG on both the Saudi and US sides, as tasks and commitments become more complex. He proposed December for the next JWG, and indicated, "our highest priority is contingency planning" for this meeting. The JWG members agreed that the Co-Chairs could designate committees as needed on an ad-hoc basis to handle specific technical issues, e.g., contingency planning, training, etc.

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Frangible Ammunition  
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¶27. (C) Sandia Labs' Guy Jones conducted a discussion of frangible ammunition. He stated that several US manufacturers make this type of ammunition, which turns to powder when it strikes hard surfaces, minimizing possible damage to petroleum facilities. However, it remains extremely effective against human adversaries. Jones urged the MOI to invest in performance testing of the ammunition, as with all new equipment to be deployed at critical facilities.

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Dr. al Jabri Underscores Threat to Energy Industry  
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¶28. (S) During the JWG meeting, Dr. Saad al Jabri, the senior MOI official present, continued to reiterate the threat facing the Saudi energy industry. He stated, "We are facing a serious threat. This is an urgent matter and we must act now. We have identified more than twenty nationalities involved in the terrorist threat against us. The threat has not relented, we are just seeing a new type of threat. All plans are now targeting the oil industry. I cannot emphasize enough the gravity of the situation." Reflecting on the state of Saudi contingency planning, al Jabri admitted their plans are not complete or comprehensive. He expressed concern that the attack on Abqaiq is a prototype of what could happen next.

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Comment  
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¶29. (S) In our assessment, Dr. al Jabri is fully on target to be gravely concerned that the Saudi MOI has not fully addressed contingency planning for petroleum operations in the event of a serious terrorist incident or attack by a neighboring state. This JWG meeting was our first opportunity to see the MOI's own baseline "contingency planning" efforts. Unfortunately, these plans dealt almost exclusively with civil defense aspects of an industrial accident or attack, focusing on the security and health of the population. While civil defense planning is a core governmental function, the MOI does not appear to have begun to grapple with Dr. al Jabri's principal concern, what DOE would term "resiliency of capability" of petroleum and other critical installations in the face of Iranian attack or internal sabotage. Fortunately, MOI is openly requesting assistance to address this serious gap.

FRAKER